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By STANLEY S. SURREYf
THE Revenue Acts have for some time exempted certain exchanges,
principally those made in the course of corporate reorganizations, from
the recognition of gain or loss at the time of the exchange. In corporate
reorganizations, the transaction, to be exempt, must take the form of an
exchange of corporate assets or stock or securities in the corporation
solely for stock or securities in another corporation which is a party to
the reorganization. If money or property other than such stock or
securities is received, gain is recognized to the extent of tie non-exempt
property. Up to 1938 both taxpayers and the Government tacitly assumed
that a corporate transferee's assumption of the obligations of a transferor
corporation in such an exchange did not give rise to the receipt by the
latter of such money or property as would necessitate the recognition of
gain. The tax consequences of countless reorganizations were established
on the basis of this belief. But in United States v. Hendler" the Supreme
Court abruptly informed the Government and the tax bar that their joint
belief could not be supported by the pertinent statutory language. This
article deals with the effect of this decision upon corporate reorganiza-
tions and other transactions involving tax-free exchanges, and with
the Congressional reaction to the decision, as expressed in the Revenue
Act of 1939.
UNITED STATES v. HENDLER
On May 21, 1929, Hendler Creamery Co.. Inc., entered into a formal
contract to transfer all its assets to the Borden Co. on the following
June 21. Hendler agreed to call for redemption its outstanding first mort-
gage bonds ($534,000 in amount and redeemable at a 73/ per cent pre-
* A companion article by the same author on "The Revenue Act of 1939 and the In-
come Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness" appears in (1940) 49 YA L. J.
1153.
t Assistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department.
The views expressed are entirely those of the writer. Nothing herein is to be con-
strued as the official opinion of the United States Treasury Department.
1. 303 U. S. 564 (1938).
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mium) on July 1, 1929, and to satisfy its mortgage at or prior to the
closing of title.2 Hendler was presumably to borrow the money neces-
sary to redeem these obligations.3 In return for Hendler's assets, Borden
was to transfer to Hendler 106,306 shares of its stock and some cash,
and to "assume and agree to pay all indebtedness and liabilities what-
soever of your company (Hendler) as the same shall exist at closing of
title to us hereunder." 4 On June 21, however, Hendler had not borrowed
any money for redemption purposes and the bonds had not been redeemed.
Borden nevertheless accepted the transfer - waiving in effect the require-
ment that the mortgage be satisfied on the closing date and, instead, as-
suming Hendler's bonded indebtedness.' Hendler distributed to its stock-
holders the shares of Borden stock and cash received on the transfer and
proceeded to dissolve pursuant to the contract.' On July 1, 1929, Borden
surrendered to the mortgage trustee in return for satisfaction of the
mortgage $7,000 of Treasury Hendler bonds, $149,000 of Hendler bonds
bought by it in the market, and $381,225 in cash to cover the remaining
bonds. The sum required to redeem the bonds was $534,297.40. I-end-
ler's remaining liabilities were likewise promptly paid: current bank loans
amounting to $1,050,000 were paid shortly after July 1 and merchandise
accounts for $130,410.78 were paid within thirty days thereafter.
Although Hendler realized a gain of over $6,000,000, the Company
asserted in its tax return that the transaction constituted a tax-free ex-
change: the transfer of all of its assets was a reorganization tinder Sec-
tion 112(i) of the Revenue Act of 1928, and the cash was distributed
to its stockholders in accordance with Section 112(d) (1). However, it
claimed the unamortized discount on its bonds and the 72 per cent
premium payable on redemption as a deduction, which claim reduced its
tax liability for the year by $6,260.33. This deduction was proper, the
Company argued, inasmuch as the $534,297.40 paid to redeem the bonds
could in effect be regarded as having been paid by Borden to Hendler
and in turn by Hendler to the bondholders. The protest which it filed
2. Record on appeal, p. 12, United States v. Hendler, 303 U. S. 564 (1938). The
record which was presented to the Supreme Court in this case will hereinafter be deqig-
nated merely as "Record."
3. Record, pp. 10, 81, 82, 83.
4. Record, pp. 9, 154. 1
5. Record, p. 155. The District Court found (Record, p. 166):
"In closing the transaction before July 1, 1929, before the bonds
were redeemed, and while they were still outstanding, Borden waived
the requirement for satisfaction of the mortgage at the closing date
and took the property subject to the bond issue, which then became
one of the liabilities of Hendler assumed at the closing by Borden,
just as it assumed the bank loans and current accounts payable; and
Borden itself paid all of them within a month thereafter."
6. Record, p. 19. Actual dissolution was completed on Aug. 5, 1930. Record, p. 35.
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with the Bureau of Internal Revenue when the deduction was questioned
stated:
"When the Borden Company deposited with the Trustee sufficient
funds to redeem the bonds it simply provided the Hendler Company
with the means of discharging an obligation of the Hendler Creamery
Company. It cannot be seriously urged that the effect of such trans-
action was to make the Borden Company the obligor of the bonds.
The bonds never became those of the Borden Company, but on the
contrary were at all times the bonds of the Hendler Creamery Com-
pany."
A canny Bureau acquiesced in this contention and then promptly asserted
a deficiency- since the $534,297.40 was "constructively received" s by
Hendler, it was money received on the exchange which, as it was not
distributed to Hendler's stockholders, resulted in recognized gain under
Section 112(d) (2). The first round clearly belonged to the Government.
Perceiving no virtue in consistency, Hendler (or rather its principal
stockholder, Mr. Hendler, against whom the deficiency was asserted under
transferee liability) paid the deficiency of $58,772.72 plus $10,781.97
interest and sued for a refund. The Government played safe by claim-
ing that the deduction for bond discount and premium should be dis-
allowed. The case was now ready for the courts. The District Court
held for Hendler :' although Borden's assumption of Hendler's liabilities
was part of the consideration received by Hendler for its assets and
therefore to be considered in computing Hendler's profit on the transfer,
the assumption did not per se constitute the receipt of "other property
or money" by Hendler within the meaning of Section 112(d), and hence
was not taxable boot. Nor could the payment of the bonded indebted-
ness be regarded as a constructive receipt of the money by Hendler within
the Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner0 rule for, by reason of
Borden's assumption of Hendler's liabilities,"' the debt when paid was
Borden's and not Hendler's debt. In other words, in form, Hendler
did not receive the money; in substance, it was exchanging an equity in
its assets for Borden stock and the incidental cash. The deduction, how-
7. Record, pp. 101, 160. As Borden had agreed to assume Hendler's current income
tax, excepting any tax liability arising out of the transfer of assets, Borden, not Hendler,
stood to profit by allowance of the deduction.
8. Compare Record, p. 123, where, in denying a refund claim made after payment
of the deficiency, the Commissioner stated that by reason of Borden's payment, Hendler
was in constructive receipt of cash.
9. Hendler v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1936).
10. 279 U. S. 716 (1929).
11. The District Court also held that if Hendler was to be regarded as in receipt of
"money" by reason of Borden's payment, it had distributed the money within the meaning
of § 112(d) (1), as the words "distributed it in pursuance of the plan of reorganization"
included a distribution among creditors and shareholders as well as to shareholders alone.
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ever, was disallowed, the district court observing that Borden, not
Hendler, had paid the redemption premium and that, as the obligation
referable to the principal of the bonds had ceased to be Hendler's lia-
bility, it could lay no claim to the unamortized discount. 2
The Government appealed on the main issue, but Hendler, once burned,
did not press for the deduction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
sustained the decision on much the same ground :1" while the payment of
an obligation results in the receipt of income and the assumption of the
bonded indebtedness must therefore be considered in computing profit,
the question was one of the taxability of the gain at the time of the
exchange. The pertinent sections, the court held, rested upon a policy
of encouraging reorganizations through postponement of tax and, as the
assumption of liabilities is a customary incident of reorganizations, con-
sidering this assumption as "other property or money" would defeat the
purpose of these Sections. 4 Both courts observed that the Government
had not chosen to extend its contention to the bank loans and mer-
chandise accounts assumed and paid by Borden, although their status
seemed indistinguishable from that of the bonded indebtedness.
But the Supreme Court, when the case came before it, was not to be
soothed by talk of reorganization policy and postponement of tax. It
saw a gain and pounced upon it:
"We are unable to agree . . . that the gain to the Hendler Com-
pany, realized by the Borden Company's payment, was exempt from
taxation under section 112.
"It was contended below and it is urged here that since the
Hendler Company did not actually receive the money with which
the Borden Company discharged the former's indebtedness, the
Hendler Company's gain of $534,297.40 is not taxable. The trans-
action, however, under which the Borden Company assumed and paid
the debt and obligation of the Hendler Company is to be regarded
in substance as though the $534,297.40 had been paid directly to the
Hendler Company. The Hendler Company was the beneficiary of
the discharge of its indebtedness. Its gain was as real and substantial
as if the money had been paid to it and then paid over by it to its
creditors. The discharge of liability by the payment of the Hendler
Company's indebtedness constituted income to the Hendler Company
and is to be treated as such [citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner and Douglas v. Willcuts].
"Section 112 provides no exemption for gains -resulting from
corporate 'reorganization'- neither received as 'stocks or securities,'
12. This point is not clear. See discussion p. 21 infra.
13. United States v. Hendler, 91 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), (1937) 24 VA. L.
REV. 203-4; Comment (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 418.
14. While the Circuit Court of Appeals did not state that § 112(d) (1) covered a
distribution to creditors, it argued that "other property or money" referred to property
susceptible of distribution among stockholders.
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nor received as 'money or other property' and distributed to stock-
holders under the plan of reorganization. In Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering it was said that this exemption 'contemplates a distribu-
tion to stockholders, and not payment to creditors." 0i The very
statute upon which the taxpayer relies provides that 'If the corpora-
tion receiving such other property or money does not distribute it
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, the gain, if any, to the
corporation shall be recognized [taxed]
"Since this gain or income of $534,297.40 of the Hendler Company
was neither received as 'stock or securities' nor distributed to its
stockholders 'in pursuance of the plan of reorganization' it was not
exempt and is taxable gain as defined in the 1928 Act." 10
The Government thereupon pocketed its $69,554.69 in taxes and interest
and surveyed the scene of battle. Then, for the first time, it realized that
its victory was indeed Pyrrhic. The hollowness of this triumph is best
revealed by an examination of the pre-Hendler treatment of assumption
of indebtedness and the effect of the decision itself.
PRIOR TREATMENT OF ASSUmPTION OF INDEBTEDNESS
The Supreme Court early ruled that one person's payment of another's
obligation might give rise to taxable income to the latter. Sample situa-
tions would be those in which an employer paid income tax due the
Government from his employee on the latter's salary,17 or payment by
a lessee of his lessor's income taxes.'8 The Court observed that "the
discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt
by the person taxed,"' 9 and thereby permitted such a payment to be
transmuted into a recognizable form of income, such as compensation
15. 302 U. S. 609, 612 (1938). In this case, decided in the same term, the transfer-
or corporation had distributed the cash it received on the reorganization to its stock-
holders pursuant to a resolution under which the stockholders had assumed the curpora-
tion's debts. The Court held that the cash had not been distributed within the meaning
of § 112(d) (1) and was taxable boot. Section 112(d) (1), it vas held, requires a distri-
bution to stockholders and does not extend to a distribution to creditors, so that if the
corporation had itself paid the debts the cash would remain taxable boot. As the stocl:-
holders were here a mere conduit, payment of the corporation's indebtedness and not a
dividend distribution to stockholders was effected, so that § 112(d) (1) was not satisfied.
The Government's brief in the Hendler case relied almost exclusively on this decision.
Cf. West Texas Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Comm'r, 68 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); see
(1938) 38 CoL L. Rzv. 685 (discussing .Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, supra).
16. United States v. Hendler, 303 U. S. 564, 566 (1938).
17. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716 (1929); .MALL, TAtA.LE
INcOME (1936) 207-212, and cases there cited.
18. United States v. Boston & M. R. R., 279 U. S. 732 (1929); .M.i Lu, op. di. supra
note 17, at 207-212, 234.
19. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716, 729 (1929).
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for services, rent, or trust income." In sales of property, the courts
established the like rule that the vendee's assumption of the vendor's debt
was to be taken into account in measuring the consideration received by
the vendor and thus in computing his taxable gain.2 It was against this
background that questions raised by the tax-free exchange sections were
to be decided. In an exchange otherwise "solely in kind," and therefore
tax-free under Section 112(b), did one party's assumption of the other's
liability constitute receipt by the latter of "other property or money,"
thereby rendering any gain on the exchange taxable to the amount of
such "other property or money," or was assumption of the liability to
be disregarded in ascertaining whether any gain should be recognized ?22
As far back as 1927, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled in what
is now a Section 112 (b) (1) situation 23 - the exchange of property held
for productive use in trade or business or for investment for property
of a like kind to be similarly held-that an assumption of a liability
did constitute such "other property or money," thereby bringing the case
within Section 112(c) (1) and rendering any gain realized on the ex-
change recognizable to the amount of the liability.24 Thus, if A transfers
an apartment house worth $10,000 and mortgaged for $4,000 in exchange
for B's apartment house worth $6,000 and B's assumption of the $4,000
mortgage, A receives "money" to the extent of $4,000. If the basis of
the apartment in A's hands is $2,000, his realized gain will be $8,000,
and under Section 112 (c) (1) that gain will be recognized to the extent of
$4,000, the "money" received. Although this interpretation was never
seriously challenged by taxpayers, it did not receive explicit judicial ap-
proval until 1936 in the Brons Hotels decision by the Board of Tax
20. Compa~e Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S.
1 (1935) ; Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552 (1935) ; MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 236-247. Although the doctrine of constructive receipt, together with the parties' rela-
tionships, turns the assumption of the obligation into one of the customary types of income
-rent, dividends, trust income, salary-that consequence is not necessary to taxation, so
that if A, having no such special relation to B, assumes and pays a debt of B's, the assump-
tion and payment, if not a gift, would per se give rise to income to A.
21. E.g., Stevenson Consol. Oil Co., 23 B. T. A. 610 (1931) ; S, R. 1226, IV-1 Ctt.
BULL. 130 (1925); United States v. Hendler, 17 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Md. 1936); cd.
Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U. S. 406 (1933) ; Regulations 103, § 19.22(a)-19.
22. The Government apparently had a third theory, for it contended in both tipper
courts in the Hendler case that if the assumption were not regarded as "other property
or money," § 112(d) was not applicable. The case, it argued, must then be viewed as if
§ 112 were not involved, so that the assumption would result in taxable gain under the
general rules. But that contention proves too much, for it makes the entire profit on
the exchange taxable, as neither § 112(b) (4) nor § 112(d) would apply-a result not
urged by the Government.
23. Unless otherwise indicated, the statutory references hereinafter made are to the
Internal Revenue Code and corresponding sections of prior Revenue Acts.
24. G.C.M. 2641, VI-2 Cmt. BULL. 16 (1927); G.C.M. 4935, VII-2 Cum. BULL.
112 (1928).
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Appeals.' The Bureau had, however, made an exactly opposite ruling
in a Section 112(b) (4) situation- the exchange, pursuant to a plan of
reorganization, by a corporation, a party to a reorganization, of property
solely for stock or securities in another corporation, also a party to the
reorganization. 2 The Bureau had said that if A corporation transferred
all of its assets to B corporation for B corporation stock (one of the
cases termed a "reorganization" by the Revenue Acts) and B corporation
assumed a liability of A corporation, whether a bank loan, mortgage, or
merchandise account payable, the assumption would not constitute "other
property or money" received by A corporation and the exchange remained
"solely for stock or securities." This interpretation was accepted without
discussion as a tenet of reorganization tax law, and countless reorganiza-
tions in which liabilities were assumed went unquestioned by the Bureau,-
the Board,"8 or the courts.2  Finally, in a Section 112(b) (5) situation
- the transfer of property by one or more persons to a corporation solely
in exchange for the corporation's stock or securities, where immediately
after the exchange such person or persons are in control of.the corpora-
tion- the Bureau's practice was apparently to treat an assumption of
a liability in the same fashion as in a Section 112(b) (4) situation.
Here also it regarded the transfer as "solely in exchange for stock or
securities."o
The varying treatments of liability assumptions in these exchanges were
justified as implementing Congress's policy of postponing the recognition
of gain in reorganizations. Most reorganizations, whether they be statu-
25. Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 376 (1936), discussed p. 10 infra; see Max
Feldman, 18 B. T. A. 1222 (1930) (problem not mentioned).
26. Compare I. T. 2364, VI-1 Cum. BULL 13 (1927); G.C.M. 7472, IX-1 Cu.
BuIL. 184 (1930); see I. T. 2392, VI-2 Cum. BuL.. 17 (1927).
27. "Situations similar to that presented in the Hendler case have arisen thousands of
times in actual reorganizations and undoubtedly hundreds of times in cases actually litigated.
In none of these cases of which there is any record did the Commissioner assert the tax
on the basis claimed in the Hcndler case." PAUL & MERT:zs, THE LAX'," o FE Frn% I:.-
com TA XATI oN (Mertens' Cum. Supp. 1939) § 17.97; id. (1934 ed.) § 17.97. The Cumu-
lative Supplement will hereinafter be referred to as Mertens' Cum. Supp. (1939).
28. Fred L. Dickey, 32 B. T. A. 1283 (1935); Frank Kell, 31 B. T. A. 212 (1934);
National Pipe & Foundry Co., 19 B. T. A. 242 (1930); Tulsa Oxygen Co., 18 B. T. A.
1283 (1930). But see Daily Tel. Co., 34 B. T. A.'101 (1936) (assumption of liabilities
included without discussion in computation of "other property" ) ; Liquidating Co., 33
B. T. A. 1173 (1936) (situation similar to Hendlkr case, but transferee corporation, in-
stead of assuming bonded indebtedness, transferred cash for redemption to trustee. Held
taxa-ble as "money" received by transferor. Whether assumption of liability involves re-
ceipt of "other property or money," wNas not urged and not passed upon).
29. Compare Hendler v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 558, 562 (D. Md. 1936); Schuh
Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); cases cited note 72 infra.
30. Fashion Center Bldg. Co., 31 B. T. A. 167 (1934) expressly so held in denying
a stepped-up basis. For discussion of the early authorities, see Eichholz, Some Tax Rishs
in Assumptions of Liability (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 543.
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tory mergers or consolidations, transfers of corporate assets for stock,
or mere changes in identity, form or place of organization, involve the
assumption of liabilities, especially where the transaction includes the
dissolution of the transferor corporation. 3 Congress's decision to exempt
from tax the gain realized on these reorganizations at the time they occur
must have carried with it as a corollary the refusal to tax some of that
gain merely because part of the consideration was in the form of an
almost inevitable assumption of liabilities. Congress certainly did not
intend, the argument ran, that a New York corporation which became
a New Jersey corporation through transferring all of its assets and
liabilities to a newly-organized New Jersey corporation should at that
time pay a tax on any increase in the value of its assets over their basis
up to the amount of the liabilities assumed.32 It was similarly argued
that, as Section 112(b) (5) was in part designed to allow partnerships
to incorporate, and as a partnership could scarcely be expected to dis-
charge all of its liabilities prior to incorporation, Congress could not have
intended gain to be recognized when a partnership transferred all its
assets and liabilities to a corporation organized to continue its business."
But it is apparent that the wording of the Revenue Acts was inadequate
to support the edifice thus erected. The words "other property or money"
in Section 112(c) (1) could scarcely be interpreted to include an assump-
tion of a liability in a Section 112(b) (1) exchange but not in a Section
112(b) (5) exchange. Nor could they mean one thing in Section 112(c)
and another in Section 112 (d)." Embarrassment, moreover, became even
31. In Western Industries Co. v. Helvering, 82 F. (2d) 461 (App. D. C. 1936), the
Commissioner asserted that an exchange did not constitute a merger or consolidation unless
the surviving corporation assumed the old corporation's liabilities.
32. The lower courts reiterated these arguments in the Hendler case. The Bureau
also pointed to § 112(d) as indicating that the term "property" must refer to property
susceptible of receipt and distribution, and hence does not include the assumption of a
liability. It added that if the assumption is to be regarded as equivalent to the receipt of
other property or money, it must, in any event, be considered as having been distributed
within that Section's meaning. Where payment of the liability did not occur in the year
of the reorganization, the distribution seems to be most "constructive." The Bureau
advanced the opposite contention with respect to "distribution" in Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U. S. 609 (1938). In accord with this view of liabilities is Western In-
dustries Co. v. Helvering, 82 F. (2d) 461 (App. D. C. 1936), in which the court dis-
regarded cash retained by the transferor to pay its liabilities in determining whether sub-
stantially all of the transferor's assets had been exchanged. Supplement R, which deals
with exchanges and distributions in obedience to orders of the SEC, provides that debts
or liabilities assumed, including a continuance of encumbrances subject to which the prop-
erty was transferred, should be included in ascertaining the extent to which the gain
should be recognized, except with respect to § 371 (d) transactions.
33. Analogous arguments may, however, be thought pertinent to § 112(b) (1) ex-
changes. See p. 33 in!ra.
34. The distribution requirement in § 112(d) is not very helpful in finding a distinc-
tion. See note 32 supra.
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more acute when the basis provisions were considered. Section 113 (a) (6)
provided that the basis of property acquired upon a tax-free exchange
should be the same as that of the property exchanged, decreased in the
amount of any money received by the taxpayer and increased in the
amount of any gain recognized upon the exchange. Suppose that A cor-
poration buys property worth $100,000 for $60,000 cash and a $40,000
purchase money mortgage. The basis of this property in the hands of
A corporation is $100,000 - its cost. Suppose that the property, which
is A corporation's sole asset, increases in value to $140,000 and is trans-
ferred to B corporation for B corporation stock worth $100,000 and B
corporation's assumption of the $40,000 mortgage. Although the profit
to A corporation is $40,000, the ruling discussed above forbids recogni-
tion of gain at the time of the exchange, as the assumption does not
constitute "other property or money," and Section 112 (d) does not apply.
A corporation then sells its B corporation stock for $100,000. It reports
no gain on this sale, for, literally following the Bureau's ruling, the stock's
basis was the same as that of the property exchanged -$100,000. If,
however, A corporation's argument be sustained, it obviously has escaped
tax on a $40,000 profit. The reorganization sections would not only
operate to postpone a tax at the time of the exchange but, together with
the basis provisions, would, as respects A corporation, prevent the Gov-
ernment ever from catching up with the profit realized by it on the
exchange.O The Bureau, rather than depart from its interpretation of
the tax-free exchange sections, met this basis difficulty by main force.
It ruled that the assumption of a liability, although not "other property
or money" for the purpose of recognizing gain under Section 112(d),
was to be considered "money received by the taxpayer" under Section
113(b) (6) for the purpose of computing the basis of the property ac-
quired upon the exchange. This construction served to reduce the basis
of the property acquired on the exchange by the amount of the liability
assumed, thereby permitting a tax when that property was later sold.
Thus, the basis of the stock of B corporation above would be $60,000,
and a tax would be imposed on a profit of $40,000 when the stock was
sold.
The Bureau's interpretation no doubt had a common sense appeal,
especially where, as in the above case of the purchase money mortgage,
the liability assumed related directly to the cost of the asset transferred."O
35. The transferee, B Corporation, would, however, take the basis of the transferor,
$100,000, under § 113(a) (7), so that it would have to pay tax on the $40,000 profit on
later sale of the property. But as in many cases this sale may never occur or the prop-
erty may decline in value, the profit may go untaxed.
36. Where the liability assumed did not relate directly to the cost of the asset trans-
ferred, as where the transferor had placed a mortgage on the property after its acquisition
so that its basis was unaffected, or where the liability was not a lien on the property, the
transferor would receive tax-free the amount of the liability if the basis of the new prop-
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Six Board members dissenting in the Brons Hotels case were willing to
support this view.37  But it is equally true that the Revenue Acts fur-
nished little foundation for the Bureau's solution of the basis difficulty,
and the remaining Board members in the Brous Hotels case refused
to accept this interpretation of the basis provisions. To avoid the escape
from tax which a consistent interpretation of Section 112(c) and (d)
and Section 113(a)(6) would produce, 8 they therefore took the al-
ternative course of treating the assumption as "money" - thus per-
mitting a tax at the time of the exchange. While the Brous Hotels
case involved a Section 112(b)(1) situation and its result accorded
with Bureau rulings on that Section, its logic leads to the same result
in other Section 112(b) exchanges.3 ' But the Bureau persisted in its
practice in Section 112(b) (4) and (5) cases, so that the whole elaborate
structure of the reorganization provisions continued to rest upon a shaky
foundation.
PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE HENDLER DECISION
With an irony often present in tax cases, the Government itself,
in the Hendler case, knocked over the structure. In almost cavalier
disregard of its well-established practice, as the lower courts and counsel
for the taxpayer pointedly observed, it claimed that Hendler's assump-
tion of the bonded indebtedness resulted in the receipt of "other prop-
erty were not reduced upon the assumption of the liability. The Bureau's rule left this
money tax free but reduced the basis of an unrelated asset, the stock in the transferee
corporation acquired by the transferor.
37. The dissenting members argued: "The basis prescribed for propcrty received in
tax-free exchanges, namely, 'the same as in the case of property exchanged' can . . .
with perfect reasonableness be held to mean the cost to the transferor less any return of
cash which he has received as by the assumption of the mortgage in the present case; the
basis will then be adjusted for recognized gain or loss as prescribed." 34 B. T. A. 376,
383 (1936). Accord, Mertens' Cum. Supp. (1939) § 17.97, n. 46. In Robinson v. Comm'r,
97 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), the taxpayer agreed to furnish an adequate water
supply to a real estate subdivision in exchange for pipes, mains, etc., worth $170,000, to
be transferred to him. Later he transferred his assets to a corporation organized by him
in exchange for its stocks and bonds and its assumption of the obligation to supply the
water. The basis of the assets, exclusive of the mains, etc., was $35,000. The taxpayer
then sold the securities and claimed a basis of $35,000 plus $170,000. The court held that
on the exchange the corporation relieved the taxpayer of his obligation, valued at $170,000,
and that its assumption of performance constituted full recovery by the taxpayer of the
consideration given by him for those particular assets, so that his basis for the securities
must be considered as $35,000.
38. In a § 112(b) (1) case, unlike the situation in § 112(b) (4) or (5) exchanges (see
note 35 supra), the profit escapes ta.: entirely, as the second party to the exchange does not
take the first party's basis.
39. In the Brons Hotels case, the Board expressly overruled its prior decision in
Fashion Center Bldg. Co., 31 B. T. A. 167 (1934), which had held an assumption not to
constitute other property or money in a § 112(b) (5) case.
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erty or money" under Section 112(d)."O The Supreme Court agreed
with this contention in an opinion which gave no consideration to the
difficulties present. The decision had two immediate and far-reaching
consequences. Those taxpayers who, believing that Section 112(b)(4)
and (5) prevented a tax, previous to the decision had transferred
property to corporations in exchange for stock and an assumption of
liabilities, were faced with the immediate threat of deficiency assess-
ments in every case where the statute of limitations had not closed
the year of the exchange. If, moreover, the case involved the transfer
in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1933, of substantially
all of a corporation's assets in return for stock and an assumption
of liabilities (and which because of lack of control could not qualify as
a reorganization under Section 112(g)(1)(C)), the recognized gain
would not be limited merely to the amount of liabilities assumed
but would extend to the entire profit on the exchange. This followed
from the change which the Revenue Act of 1934 effected in Section
112(g) (which defined the term "reorganization") whereby under
clause (B) such a transfer of assets was included only if the assets were
exchanged "solely for . . .voting stock." If an assumption of liabilities
was to be regarded as equivalent to the receipt of "other property or
money," so that the exchange was not "solely for stock or securities"
under Section 112(b) (4), the Government might likewise argue that it
was not "solely for . . .voting stock" within the meaning of Section
112(g) (1)(B), and thereby make the entire transfer taxable.41 Tax-
payers were also confronted with the future prospect of being unable
to effect corporate reorganizations involving the assumption of liabilities
without paying a tax at the time of the reorganization.
The Government was threatened with a possible loss of a very large
amount of revenue through the operation of the basis provisions. As
observed above, the bisis of the assets transferred by the transferor cor-
poration became, under Section 113 (a) (6), the basis of the stock which
it received on the exchange, decreased in the amount of any money
received, and increased in the amount of any gain recognized on the
exchange. When an assumption of liabilities was involved, the Bureau,
to make the basis provisions operate properly, had treated the assump-
tion as "money" received by the transferor and accordingly had reduced
the basis of the assets transferred. As this assumption was not treated
40. Although the Government did not assert a tax on the bank loans and merchandise
accounts which Borden assumed and paid, it did not even attempt to distinguish their
status from that of the bonded indebtedness. If a distinction existed, it was indeed diffi-
cult to perceive.
41. Compare IONTGONT-ERY, F-.DERL I-co-im TAx HA. Dr, (193S) 101. Before
the Hendler decision, the Bureau apparently took the position that an assumption of lia-
bilities did not prevent the exchange from being solely for voting stock within the mean-
ing of § 112(g) (1) (B).
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as the receipt of "other property or money" under Section 112(d), no
gain was recognized and there was therefore no amount to be added to
the basis thus reduced. The phrase in Section 113(a) (6), "amount of
gain . . . recognized upon such exchange under the law applicable to
the year in which the exchange was made," refers, however, to the gain
recognizable under such law and not to the gain actually recognized in
a particular case.42 Transferors were therefore in a position after the
Hendler decision to claim that the basis of the stock they had received
on prior exchanges should be increased by the amount of gain that should
have been recognized and taxed by reason of the transferee corporation's
assumption of liabilities, even though this gain had not been actually
taxed. If, moreover, the exchange occurred after 1933 and was of the
Section 112(g) (1) (B) type, the increase in basis would extend to the
entire gain realized, as the transfer, not being "solely for . . . voting
stock," did not constitute a tax-free exchange. If the exchange occurred
in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1931, Section 820 of the
Revenue Act of 1938 would afford the Government some protection
against such a claim for a stepped-up basis, 43 but for exchanges prior
to 1932, when the majority of the reorganizations took place, the door
was wide open.44
The transferee corporation which assumed the liabilities and was most
likely to pay tax on any profit with respect to the assets could also in
many cases claim a stepped-up basis for the assets it had acquired upon the
exchange. Under Section 113(a) (7) and (8), its basis for these assets
was their basis in the hands of the transferor at the time of the exchange,
increased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor under the
law applicable to the year in which the exchange occurred.4 5 Section 820
42. Corpus Christi Terminal Co., 38 B. T. A. 944 (1938); David B. Gann, 23 B. T.
A. 999, 1003-4 (1931), aff'd, 61 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
650 (1932); PAUL & MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934 ed.)
§ 18.111; S. M. 2723, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 26 (1924).
43. Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938 (1939) 48
YALE L. J. 509, 719, 764-5. The section is now INT. REv. CODE § 3801.
44. The doctrine of estoppel affords slight support-all the facts were known, there
was only a mistake of law. Helvering v. Williams, 97 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ;
United States v. Dickinson, 95 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938); and Helvering v. Sal-
vage, 297 U. S. 106 (1935) are more pertinent than Alamo Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 95 F.
(2d) 622 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 577 (1938); Robbins v. United
States, 21 F. Supp. 403 (Ct. Cl. 1937) ; Larken v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 951 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1935). But see Becker v. Bemis, 104 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U. S. 613 (1939).
45. If the exchange were in a taxable year beginning prior to Jan. 1, 1936, and 50%
control did not.exist after the transfer, the transferee took cost to it as its basis. Thus, in
the Hendler case itself, Borden had as its basis the cost to it of the acquisition of the
Hendler assets, so that, as its basis already reflected the assumption of the bonded indebt-
edness, it was immaterial to Borden whether the assumption would result in the recogni-
tion of gain.
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offered no protection to the Government against such a claim by the
transferee.4  As to reorganizations consummated before the Heudler
case, these claims by transferor and transferee for a stepped-up basis
were tenable not only where the stocks or assets had been sold in a prior
year still open, but also if the sale were to occur in any later year. The
Government, however, could not assert deficiencies against transferors
unless the year of the reorganization were still open, so that a Govern-
ment which gained $69,554.69 in the Henzdlcr case stood to lose perhaps
millions of dollars as a result of that victory.
These consequences would result if the Hendler case were given its
broadest possible interpretation -that any assumption of a liability, or
even the acquisition of property subject to a liability, involves the receipt
of "other property or money." But it was apparent that both taxpayers
and Government would fight to restrict the Hendlcr decision wherever
a limitation appeared advantageous. As there had been literally thousands
of prior reorganizations in which the assumption of liabilities had not
been treated as "other property or money," a widespread battle between
taxpayers and Government appeared inevitable. Like much tax litigation
- witness the Heudler case - the fighting promised to be catch-as-catch-
can, with Government and taxpayer urging a position which would mean
victory in the particular instance, regardless of the case's effect as a prece-
dent.4 7 Thus, after the Hendler decision, in a case in which the Govern-
ment was resisting a transferee's claim for a stepped-up depreciation basis
with respect to a transfer that occurred in 1929,48 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that no gain should have been recognized to
the transferor 49 as the liability had not been paid during 1929. But a
Government asserting a deficiency for 1933 against a transferor in a
Section 112(b) (5) exchange in that year, though the liabilities were
apparently not all paid in the year of exchange, was later able to con-
vince the Board of Tax Appeals that payment was immaterial." This
meant, however, that when the Board had before it, with respect to a
46. See note 43 supra. Nor would the doctrine of estoppel help the Government,
for if the transferee had taken any position, it w%as only one to its detriment in computing
depreciation or depletion on the assets at a lower basis than it should have employed.
Under the Hendler decision, the transferee would be entitled to a higher basis for depre-
dation or depletion, as well as for gain or loss, though this would in part help the Gov-
ernment by reason of § 113(b) (1) (B).
47. For the reasons underlying this characteristic of tax litigation, see Traynor, Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes--a Criti-
civ.i and a Proposal (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1393, 1406-1411.
48. Bicdford's, Inc. v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 56S (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). The deprecia-
tion deduction involved the tax for 1931.
49. The taxpayer had not raised the point below, as the Hendler case had not then
been decided, so that the court's observation was not necessary to the decision. The Gov-
ernment presumably had not mentioned the point.
50. Walter F. Haass, 37 B. T. A. 948 (1938).
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sale in 1934, a transferee corporation's claim for stepped-up basis on
assets acquired in an exchange in 1931 involving an assumption of lia-
bilities as to which there was no evidence that the tax had been paid
by the transferor, the increased basis was allowed though the transferee
did not pay all the liabilities during the year of the exchange." And in
taxing a transferor in a Section 112(b) (1) exchange, the Government
successfully contended that the other party's acquisition of the trans-
feror's property subject to a liability involved the receipt of "money"
by the transferor in the same manner as if the liability had been assumed,
though this interpretation when applied to Section 112(b) (4) and (5)
exchanges would serve to increase the claims for stepped-up bases02
It became only too apparent both to Government and taxpayers that
this retroactive departure from an accepted practice constituted thoroughly
unsound tax administration, especially as the extent of the departure
was to be determined only by the protracted process of judicial decision.
Until future Supreme Court decisions staked out the limits of the Hendler
case, taxpayers would be forced to plan and consummate their reorgani-
zations in an atmosphere of extreme tax uncertainty. Both Government
and taxpayers therefore joined in requesting that Congress furnish a
statutory solution to these difficulties. 3 Congress answered with Sec-
tion 213 of the Revenue Act of 1939.
SOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE REVENUE ACT OF 1939
Congress's method of response was restoration of the pre-Hendler
treatment of Section 112 (b) (4) and (5) exchanges - a solution which
seems highly justifiable. As assumption of the transferor's liabilities is
an integral part of most reorganizations, a broad interpretation of the
Hendler case would seriously hamper, perhaps nullify, the effectiveness
of the reorganization provisions. While the wisdom of many of the
reorganization provisions may be debatable, and cogent arguments have
been advanced for their elimination or amendment, 4 the broad policy
questions involved should be met head-on. There has never been a thor-
ough, impartial investigation of the operation of the reorganization pro-
51. Corpus Christi Terminal Co., 38 B. T. A. 944 (1938), remanded to the Board in
Comm'r v. Corpus Christi Terminal Co., 110 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940). See
note 86 infra.
52. Estate of Theodore Ebert, Jr., 37 B. T. A. 186 (1938).
53. Compare MONTGOMERY, Op. cit. supra note 41, at 121-2; Mertens' Cum. Supp.
(1939) § 17.97; AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AVWANCE PROGRAM (1938) 102-3; Hear-
ings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939) 44-52, 59-62, 91-93, 106, 260-261.
54. Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations" (1938) 38 COL. L.
REv. 98; SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. PRELIM. REP., 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) 8-9. On the reorganization sections in general, see Fahey, Income Tax Deft-
niton of "Reorganication" (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 933.
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visions. Until such an inquiry is undertaken, the subject cannot be dealt
with fairly, for emotional arguments are scarcely a substitute for in-
vestigation. Permitting stocks and securities to be received without the
recognition of gain but taxing the assumption of liabilities scarcely seems
realistic. Unless and until it is decided to discard the reorganization
sections it is the part of tax wisdom to see that they function sensibly.
That the assumption of a liability should not result in the recognition
of gain is an essential of sensible operation of the provisions.
Section 213 (a) of the 1939 Act adds new subsection (k) to Section
112 of the Internal Revenue Code. This new subsection states in part:
"(k) Assumption of Liability Not Recognized -Vhere upon
an exchange the taxpayer receives as part of the consideration prop-
erty which would be permitted by subsection (b) (4) or (5) of this
section to be received without the recognition of gain if it were the
sole consideration, and as part of the consideration another party to
the exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer or acquires from
the taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption or acqui-
sition shall not be considered as 'other property or money' received
by the taxpayer within the meaning of subsection (c), (d), or (e)
of this section and shall not prevent the exchange from being within
the provisions of subsection (b) (4) or (5)......
The amount of the liability is thus to be considered in computing the
amount of gain or loss realiaed on the exchange but is to be disregarded
in ascertaining the amount of the realized gain which is to be rccognized
at that time. The provision that the assumption or acquisition shall not
prevent the exchange from being within the provisions of Section 112-
(b) (4) or (5) removes the difficulties caused by the requirement in
those subsections that the exchange be "solely" for stock or securities. Al-
though these changes would be effective in preventing the assumption
or acquisition from resulting in the recognition of gain on the exchange,z0
they might easily be subject to abuse. Suppose, for example, that A
intends to transfer some assets to B corporation, which he controls, for
$100,000 worth of B corporation stock and $50,000 cash. To avoid the
provision of Section 112(c) (1) which taxes the receipt of cash, A bor-
rows $50,000 from a bank prior to the transfer and B corporation assumes
55. The Regulations state that in addition to the transferee's assumption of a per-
sonal liability of the transferor, the new subsection includes an acquisitiun of property
subject to a liability, whether or not the transferor vas personally liable, and the assump-
tion of a liability where the property transferred was held by the transferor merely sub-
ject to the liability. Regulations 103, § 19.112(a)-2.
56. Where the liability "assumed" is that of the transferor to the transferee, sts that
the debt is thus paid and cancelled, gain would presumably be recognized to the trans-
feror, as the transaction can scarcely be considered the "assumption" of a liability. Cf.
R. D. Walker, 34 B. T. A. 983 (1936). But the case does not differ materially from the
normal situation where the debt is owed to a third party.
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his note to the bank. If such an assumption were not to result in the
recognition of gain, A would have his $50,000 in cash tax-free at the
time of the exchange.57 New subsection 112(k) therefore provides that:
"except that if, taking into consideration the nature of the liability
and the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for
the assumption or acquisition was made, it appears that the princi-
pal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acqui-
sition was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange,
or if not such a purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose, such
assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for
the purposes of this section, be considered as money received by the
taxpayer upon the exchange."
Under this exception, B corporation's assumption of the $50,000 liability
is tantamount to the receipt of $50,000 by A. It should also be noted
that if B corporation had assumed A's alimony obligations, not for the
purpose of avoiding income tax on the transfer, but to concentrate A's
obligations in a corporation with assets sufficient to pay them, the type
of business ordinarily conducted by B corporation might be such that
the assumption could scarcely be considered as having a bona fide business
purpose.
As the tax-free exchange sections are themselves designed to avoid
federal income tax, the test set up by Section 112(k) may cause trouble.
Suppose that a reorganization had been planned prior to the Revenue Act
of 1939 in which the transferor was to pay the debts with part of the
cash to be received from the transferee (the Hendler case had made the
method of payment immaterial). Before the exchange was consummated,
the Act became effective and the parties thereupon arranged for the trans-
feree to pay the debts, thus reducing the amount of cash to be received.
Or suppose that parties, in arranging an exchange after 1939, have come
to the question of which corporation shall pay the debts. "The trans-
feree," say the lawyers with one voice, "so that we can reduce taxes." Is
the principal purpose one to avoid the federal income tax? 8 The test
57. In a § 112(b) (4) exchange where the reorganization takes the form of a transfer
of substantially all of one corporation's properties, for voting stock of the acquiring cor-
poration (§ 112(g) (1) (B)), the requirement that substantially all the properties be trans-
ferred serves to limit the possibilities of abuse, as the retention of, a large amount of cash
prevents the transfer from satisfying that requirement. As to what is "substantially all"
the assets, see Schuh Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938);
Milton Smith, 34 B. T. A. 702 (1936) and cases therein cited. The possibility of abuse
could have been limited by making an assumption of liabilities tax free only if the trans-
feror liquidated, although the protection afforded by the liquidation requirement would
depend in part upon how a court would view the segregation in another corporation prior
to the reorganization of the cash, or property purchased by such cash, made available by
the transferee's assumption of the liability.
58. If the Commissioner finds the assumption to be "money" under the exception, and
the taxpayer contends otherwise, as where the transferor resists a deficiency on the ex-
change, new subsection (k) requires the taxpayer to sustain his burden of proof by a
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adopted, although admittedly vague, seems the best available under the
circumstances. Tests based upon the type of debt: bonds, bank loans,
accounts receivable, long or short-term obligations; or the time the debt
was incurred: one, two, three years, etc. prior to the exchange; or the
time the transferee satisfied the liability; or upon similar factors would
prove far less satisfactory. As the Commissioner in the past has per-
mitted liabilities to be assumed tax-free, he cannot be expected to be
too restrictive in applying the test adopted in Section 112(k). A case
on all fours with the Hendler case would presumably go the other way
under the Section 112(k) test, as the transferee's immediate payment
of the liability it assumed should not of itself make the assumption
mala fide.
Finally, the definition of "reorganization" in subsection 112(g) was
altered to provide that, in ascertaining whether one corporation's acqui-
sition of substantially all of another corporation's properties was in ex-
change "solely" for the former's voting stock, the assumption of a lia-
bility of the transferor or the acquisition of property subject to a liability
shall be disregarded." This rule applies whether or not the assumption
or acquisition is regarded as "money" under subsection (k), so that
the taxpayer's risk in the close case is merely that gain will be recog-
nized up to the amount of the liability, and not that the exchange will
cease to be tax-free.60
clear preponderance of the evidence. If it is the taxpayer who is claiming that the assump-
tion shall be considered as "money," as where the transferor or transferee is claiming a
stapped-up basis, then this requirement is not placed upon him nor is a correspunding
requirement placed upon the Commissioner. Cf. § 102 (also has standard of "clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence").
59. Section 112(g) (1) (B) is now restricted to the acquisition of 80 of the stocl"
for voting stock, as to which the requirement of "solely" for voting stock is kept, and
§ 112(g) (1) (C) now relates to the transfer of substantially all the properties for voting
stock. The succeeding clauses in § 112(g) (1) have been relettered.
60. While the exception in § 112(k) states that it shall be considered as muney "for
the purposes of this Section," new § 112(g) (1) (C) should be deemed to govern in a case
where the assumption is considered as money, as it specifically states that the assumption
shall be disregarded in determining whether the exchange is solely for voting stock. See
H. R. RxP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 19. But cf. Mertens' Cum. Supp. (1939)
17.60.
The rule of Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U. S. 609 (1938) that § 112(d)( 1)
is confined to a distribution to stockholders is still operative. If the assumptiun of a lia-
bility is considered as "money" under the exception, gain will therefore be recognized to
the transferor under § 112(d) (2) as the "money" has not been distributed to stocktold-
ers. Gain will also be recognized if the transferee, instead of assuming the liabilities,
transfers cash to the transferor and the latter uses this cash to discharge the liabilities.
But if the transferee assumes the liabilities and discharges then by payment of cash to
the creditors, this cash cannot be regarded as being constructively received by the trans-
feror. While the tax consequences of the treatment of the transferor's liabilities thus turn
on the mechanics of the transfer, it was apparently thought advisable, in order to minimize
possible tax avoidance, not to permit any cash to pass tax free directly to the transferor.
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The requirement of "solely for voting stock" had been inserted by the
Revenue Act of 1934 to prevent tax-free transfers for some voting stock
plus short-term notes, bonds, or other obligations which did not differ
greatly from cash and whose presence made the exchange very similar
to an outright sale." Thus, if property were transferred to a new cor-
poration in connection with a reorganization and the old corporation's
bondholders received stocks and bonds of the new corporation in exchange
for their bonds, and the stockholders received some stock, there would
not be a reorganization within the meaning of former Section 112(g)
(1) (B), because the transfer of bonds made the exchange run afoul of
the "solely for voting stock" requirement.0 2 If the bonded indebtedness
were in terms assumed by the new corporation, it might perhaps be argued
that the amendment to Section 112(g) (1) would make this a reorganiza-
tion under new (C) : the new corporation would have issued voting stock
and assumed the old corporation's bonded indebtedness; its issuance of
stock and bonds directly to the bondholders might be taken to constitute
payment of the indebtedness, leaving the exchange as one of assets for
voting stock and assumption of the indebtedness. Presumably, no gain
or loss would be recognized to the bondholders on such a payment as
the payment would seem to be an exchange pursuant to a plan of reor-
ganization within the meaning of Section 112(b) (3). If assets should
be transferred and the old corporation's stockholders, who were also its
creditors, should receive voting stock and also some short-term notes
(the latter being equal to the old corporation's indebtedness to them) the
transfer may also be a reorganization, as the notes could be considered
payment of the debts assumed. This does not mean that the abuses pos-
sible prior to the Revenue Act of 1934 have again been introduced, for
the field which such obligations may occupy under the amendment to
Section 112(g) (1) now is limited to the old corporation's indebtedness
whereas it previously extended to the net worth, and the obligations now
must go to the old corporation's creditors. If the provision for the ex-
change of stock and bonds for bonds in the transfer first considered
above were regarded as an obligation of the new to the old corporation
61. See Fahey, Income Tax Definition of "Reorganizatioe" (1939) 39 COL. L. REv.
933, 949-954, 959.
62. Comm'r v. Kitselman, 89 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.
S. 709 (1937) ; Comm'r v. Newberry Lumber & Chem. Co., 94 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 6th,
1938) ; cf. Frederick L. Leckie, 37 B. T. A. 252 (1938) ; Marlborough House, Inc., 40
B. T. A. No. 133 (1939); Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 41 B. T. A. No. 51 (1940).
Cases such as these imply that, if the old corporation were insolvent, such an exchange
would be a reorganization under former § 112(g) (1) (C), as control is possessed by the
bondholders (if they received the proper percentage of the .stock) who, under these facts,
may be considered as shareholders of the old corporation. These decisions hardly
seem to interpret the reorganization sections properly. See Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S.
415 (1940) ; dissenting opinions in Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., supra.
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and hence as additional consideration for the assets, the transaction might
be ruled not to be a reorganization inasmuch as the transfer would not
be solely for voting stock and an assumption of indebtedness. Moreover,
if the plan did not provide for an express assumption of the indebted-
ness, the transaction might also be held not to be a reorganization unless
such an assumption or an acquisition subject to the indebtedness were
implied from the transaction itself.
With respect to the basis provisions, Congress remedied the defect in
the existing law by adding the following sentence to Section 113 (a) (6):
"Where as part of the consideration to the taxpayer another party
to the exchange assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from
the taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption or
acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for the purposes
of this paragraph, be considered as money received by the taxpayer
upon the exchange."
This reduction occurs whether or not the assumption of liability is
"money" for the purposes of recognition of gain under Section 112(k),
as it is always regarded as "money" under Section 113(a) (6). If the
assumption is taxed as "money" under the exception provided in Section
112(k), the basis is of course increased by the anmount of gain so recog-
nized. Under Section 113(a) (6) as amended, it is mathematically pos-
sible for a minus basis to occur in cases where the assumption is tax-free.
If A corporation exchanges assets having a basis of $5,000 but worth
$20,000 for B corporation stock worth $14,000 and B corporation's as-
sumption of a $6,000 liability of A corporation, a literal reading of
Section 113(a) (6) would result in the basis of the stock in A corpora-
tion's hands being $5,000 minus $6,000, or minus $1,000. Although the
amendment is silent on this point, the Bureau presumably will be governed
by its previous practice of eliminating a minus basis by raising it to zero.'
If the amendment had met this problem by taxing the transferor at
the time on so much of the assumption as is equal to the minus basis,
thereby producing a zero basis (in the above example this solution would
produce a tax on $1,000 and require the addition to the basis of $1,000,
the amount recognized as gain, thus making it zero), the corollary would
have been an increase in the transferee's basis by the amount of gain so
recognized. The solution adopted, that of leaving the matter to Bureau
practice, permanently relieves the transferor of tax on so much of the
assumption as produces the minus basis and leaves the transferee poten-
tially liable for this tax as the transferee's basis is not increased when
the transferor's basis is raised to zero without recognition of gain."
63. A minus basis may also occur by reason of § 112(d) (1). Suppose, in the ennchange
in the text, B corporation, instead of assuming the liability, paid 1 corporation 16,0)
cash which the latter distributed to its stockholders.
64. This solution accords with the policy underlying the requirement that the trans-
feree takes a substituted basis in these cases, so that the Government may look primarily
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Both the exception in new subsection 112(k) and the sentence added
to Section 113 (a) (6) consider the assumption of a liability or the acqui-
sition subject to a liability as "money" in the "amount of the liability.""oU
There is therefore ordinarily no occasion to value the liability. The
assumption of a $1,000 demand note bearing interest at six per cent and
of a $1,000 ten-year note bearing interest at three per cent are both
treated a' equivalent to the receipt of $1,000 in money."0 The reliance
upon the "amount of the liability" also makes unnecessary a valuation
of the transferee's express or implied promise to pay the liability. The
assumption of a $100,000 note by a financially sound corporation, or by a
corporation whose assets barely exceed its liabilities so that its ultimate full
payment of the note is doubtful, both result in $100,000 of "money" to
be deducted from the transferor's old basis. The transferee's acquisition
of property subject to a $100,000 mortgage is also treated as "money"
in the amount of $100,000, regardless of the property's. value."
Although this solution accords with the run of the mill case and elim-
inates the problems which attend valuation, it may necessitate adjustments
as a result of the transferee's later action. If the transferee fails to pay
either the liability which it assumed or to which it took subject, and the
transferor is called upon to make payment, he seems entitled to a deduc-
tion either under Section 23(e) (2) for a loss incurred in a transaction
entered into for profit in the case of an individual transferor, or tinder
Section 23(f) in the case of a corporation, or possibly also under Section
23(k) for a bad debt-that of the transferee to the transferor where
the former assumed the liability. The deduction will thus result in an
ordinary loss, although the reduction in basis caused by the assumption
may result in capital gain. The alternative course of valuing the trans-
feree's promise and reducing the basis by an amount less than the liability
would have meant that the transferee's later payment of the full amount
to the transferee for the tax. Thus, the reduction in basis provided for in the amendment
to § 113 (a) (6) itself becomes immaterial where the transferor liquidates.
65. Where the liability assumed is the joint liability of two transferors, the "amount
of the liability" must refer to the amount of each transferor's ultimate share of the lia-
bility, even though, as respects the creditor, each may be liable severally for the entire
amount. The contrary interpretation would produce too large a reduction in basis.
66. The "amount of the liability" is the amount of unpaid principal plus any accrued
interest unpaid. Where the liability is a contract obligation, valuation difficulties may
occur. Suppose that corporation A has contracted to deliver a hotel's coal requirements
for a year, for which it has received payment in advance. It transfers its assets to cor-
poration B in exchange for B stock and the assumption of the hotel contract. Here the
obligation assumed by corporation B must be valued in order to obtain the basis of the
stock in corporation B's bonds. Cf. Robinson v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938) (similar situation). The term "liability" certainly seems broad enough to cover
any obligation of the transferor.
67. This solution follows the Bureau and Board practice on this point; see notes 24
and 25 smpra.
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of the liability would have resulted either in gain, presumably capital
gain, to the transferor, or a further reduction of basis if the transferor
still held the stock acquired upon the exchange. This would have required
express statutory language and would have placed upon the Government
the onerous burden of keeping an eye upon the transferee's later actions.
The transferee's basis is not affected by its later action in regard to
the liability. Its assumption of the liability is part of its cost, but under
Section 113(a) (7) and (8) its basis is fixed not by the cost to it of
the property acquired but by the property's basis in the transferor's hands
prior to the exchange. Later full or part payment of the liability hence
will not affect the transferee's basis ;s nor will the transferee be able to
obtain a deduction for the payment as a business expense. ° Any interest
paid by the transferee on the liability would be deductible, except that
which accrued prior to the assumption and is therefore part of the cost
along with the principal." If the indebtedness assumed by the transferee
were cancelled under circumstances which would otherwise give rise to
taxable income, it seems that the cancellation would result in income to
the transferee, even though payment of the liability would not have had
a tax consequence. 7"
The courts have held that if corporation .4 merges or consolidates
with corporation B, the latter may continue to deduct A corporation's
remaining unamortized bond discount over the life of the bonds, but
that if corporation A transfers its assets to corporation B in exchange
for stock and an assumption of its liabilities in a tax-free reorganization
which is not a strict merger or consolidation, corporation B will not be
allowed this deduction. 2 The transferee, it seems, should not normally
68. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 20 states that "No amend-
ment is made to Section 113(a) (7) or (8), because the payment by the transferee of the
liabilities assumed, or to which the property was subject, dues not give rise to any in-
crease or adjustment of the basis of the property transferred."
69. In Athol ,ffg. Co. v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 230 (C. C. A. 1st, P31I a curpura-
tion which had assumed liabilities upon an acquisition of assets claimed that later payment
of the liabilities entitled it to a deduction for an ordinary and necessary busines.s vxpense.
The court denied the deduction, stating that the payment constituted itart of the consid-
eration for the assets and hence was a capital item. Accord, Falk Corp. v. tin7m'r, 60 F.
(2d) 204 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Sigmund Spitzer, 23 B. T. k. 77t (1931); Caldwell &
Co., 26 B. T. A. 790 (1932); F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B. T. .. 79 9 (1925).
70. Compare Harvey M.. Toy, 34 B. T. A. 877 (1936) with Automatic Sprinkler C-..,
27 B. T. A. 160 (1932).
71. The income realized on this cancellation would presumably be measured by ref-
erence to the amount of the obligations assumed by the transferee, less appriloriate deduc-
tions for amortized discount, etc. But see discussion in text following. The transferor
would not be affected by this cancellation, even though its basis had been reduced by the
full amount of the liability. The discussion on p. 20 supra relates to a situation in which
the transferor is later called upon to make payment. Cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 40 B. T.
A. No. 170 (1939), discussed note 98 infra.
72. Helvering v. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., Helvering v. 'Metropolitan Edison
Co., 306 U. S. 522 (1939) (deduction allowed where merger either statutory or de facto);
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be entitled to the deduction, as the discount is a part of the obligation
which it assumed and hence is part of the cost. 3 While the transferee
may deduct interest accruing after the assumption, and bond discount is
in effect equivalent to a higher rate of interest, it seems more similar in
this respect to interest already accrued, which is not deductible. There
is therefore no inequity in denying the deduction as such to the transferee.
Although the consideration received by the transferor will be less by the
amount of the obligation, and although the previous money obtained
tax-free is less than the amount of the obligation due to the discount,
the amended basis provisions nevertheless require the transferor to deducf
the full amount of the obligation from its old basis, so that through the
reduction in basis it suffers a tax disadvantage equal to the amount of
the unamortized discount. To achieve a proper result here, it seems that
the deduction from basis should be the amount of the liability less un-
amortized discount - in fact, the amount of the liability less any accrued
liability required to be deducted from basis and not previously reflected
either as tax-free income or as a deduction.
This adjustment in basis will not, however, help the transferor if it
liquidates, as it always does where there is a merger or consolidation.
As the deduction will be lost unless granted to some one, and as in a
strict merger or consolidation the transferee is really the transferor in
another form, the courts are perhaps justified in allowing the transferee
to take the deduction. But in other reorganization cases, the inequity to
the transferor is scarcely cancelled by allowing the transferee the deduc-
tion. Nor is there any reason to give the transferee such a windfall, for
it paid less by assuming the discount obligation; in any event, its basis
is fixed regardless of actual cost. The transferor, however, might possibly
claim the entire amount of the unamortized discount as a deduction in the
year of the exchange, inasmuch as the consideration which it received
General Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 306 U. S. 530 (1939) (allowed where statutory
merger) ; American Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
(allowed where statutory merger; not allowed where merely reorganization) ; Turner-
Farber-Love Co. v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 416 (App. D. C. 1933) (disallowed where
merely reorganization); American Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 151
(Ct. Cl. 1936) (allowed where statutory merger; not allowed where merely reorganiza-
tion).
73. A premium payable on redemption should be deductible by the transferee, as the
expense had not occurred when the bonds were assumed, unless, as in the Hendler case,
the bonds had been called for redemption by the transferor. Coast Counties Gas & Elce.
Co., 36 B. T. A. 385 (1937), modifying 33 B. T. A. 1199 (1936), and American Gas &
Elec. Co. v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) allow deduction for the
premium whether the transfer is by way of merger or consolidation or by ordinary re-
organization; Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 36 B. T. A. 467 (1937) and Metro-
politan Edison Co., 35 B. T. A. 1110 (1937) (issue not involved on appeal in 306 U. S.
522 (1939)) allowed the deduction in cases involving statutory and de facto mergers; the
point of call by the transferor has not been discussed.
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was reduced through the transferee's assumption of payment of this
amount and in that sense the discount was "paid" by the transferor.7"
The final change made by Section 213 concerns Section 112(b) (5).
Under a proviso, that Section is applicable to an exchange by two or more
persons "only if the amount of the stock and securities received by each
is substantially in proportion to his interest in the property prior to the
exchange." The purpose of this proviso is not clear.7" As the Section
was presumably adopted to permit individuals or partnerships to incor-
porate, it may have been thought appropriate to require that the same
degree of control should exist in the corporation as previously existed in
the partnership. But a provision designed to perpetuate the previous
degree of control over the transferred property becomes meaningless if
the property was not previously jointly owned by the transferors. As
the Section has usually been regarded as applicable to a case where A
transfers to the corporation property which he owned entirely and B
transfers other property which he owned, so that their control over the
property is appreciably altered, this suggested reason for the proviso is
of little value.76 While the perpetuation of control in the partnership case
and the application of the proviso to non-partnership cases prevents what
are, in effect, sales for cash and stock, this purpose neither seems neces-
sary, inasmuch as the cash would be taxed under Section 112(c) (1),
nor in harmony with the treatment accorded to "boot" on the other
Section 112(b) exchanges."7 If the proviso is intended to preserve the
financial status quo and to prevent one transferor from obtaining more
than his share, it disregards both the bargaining ability of the other trans-
feror and the fact that the first transferor would still retain his old basis,
so that his tax would ultimately be greater."'
The few cases that have considered this proviso indicate two possible
interpretations: (1) the percentage of each transferor's interest in the
stock and securities received must be substantially the same as the per-
centage of his interest in the total property transferred to the corpora-
74. But cf. Hendler v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1936) and discussion
pp. 3-4 supra; American Gas & Electric Co. v. Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 527, 529, 531 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936) (indicating that transferor may not take deduction).
75. The legislative history is not helpful. SIOmAx, LEcisL,-rTiE HsTor" or
FERmAL Ihcoz TAx LAws (1938) 332, 690, 7,89, S98.
76. Snead v. Jackson Securities & Investm. Co., 77 F. (2d) 19 (C. C A. 5th, 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 599 (1935) (Sibley, J., dissenting); American C. & W. Co. v.
Bender, 70 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), ccrt. denicd, 293 U. S. 607 (1934).
77. Compare dissenting opinion in Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B. T. A. 732, 745 (1937),
discussed note 83 infra.
78. PAUL & .MERTENs, THE LAW OF FEDEPIAL IncO:,E TA.XATIO.N. (1934 ed.) § 17A3,
half suggests that both the stocks and the securities received must each be in the requisite
proportion. But this can scarcely be so. The value test clearly disregards any such re-
quirement and the Revenue Act of 1939 is likewise premised upon a lack of differentiation
between stocks and securities. See pp. 25-26 in ra.
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tion; (2) the value of the stock and securities received by each transferor
must be substantially the same as the value of the property which he
transferred to the corporation. Although both tests would reach the same
result in many situations, the second test is far more exacting inasmuch
as slight variations in the percentage of interest may, where large amounts
are involved, account for significant differences between the property's
value and the value of the stock. Thus the situation in United Carbon
Co. v. Coninissioiner79 met the first test, for the greatest difference in
the percentage of interest was 1.36 per cent and the difference exceeded
one per cent with respect to but two out of the fourteen transferors
involved. But the second test was not satisfied as one transferor received
stock whose value represented a net gain of 21.93 per cent over his
property's value (his property was worth $256,293 and his stock $312,-
499, the difference in percentage of interest being plus .57 per cent -
2.58 per cent as compared with 3. 15 per cent), another received a net
gain of 12. 17 per cent, another a net gain of 11 per cent, another a net
loss of 9.10 per cent, and another a net loss of 28.41 per cent. While
the first test seems to accord more closely with the proviso's language -
the amount received must be substantially in proportion to the interest
in the property, and not substantially equal in value to the interest in
the property - the cases now favor the second view."
Aside, however, from the problem of interpretation, there remained
the question of the treatment of the assumption of a liability. Suppose
that A transferred a $10 asset to a corporation for ten shares of stock
and B transferred a $10 asset subject to a $4 mortgage for six shares
of stock and the assumption of the mortgage. If the words in the proviso,
79. 90 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (involving claim for stepped-up deprecia-
tion basis; Government unsuccessfully urged first interpretation).
80. In accord with the United Carbon case is Comm'r v. Lincoln-Boyle Ice Co,, 93
F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) (holding proviso not satisfied where percentages in prop-
erty were 46.77%, 26.74%, 9.11% and 17.36%, percentages of stock 54.59%, 17.31%,
14.19% and 13.89%, and percentages of gain or loss in value, plus 16.71%, minus 35.23%,
plus 55.71%, and minus 20.00%; transferee's claim for stepped-up basis also involved
here; Government unsuccessfully urged first interpretation) ; Snead v. Jackson Securities
& Investm. Co., 77 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 599; Port-
land Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). But see Dieseher v.
Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
The Board originally adopted the percentage test without discussion of the value
test. Ared Corp., 30 B. T. A. 1080 (1934); Record Petroleum Co., 32 B. T. A. 1270
(1935); cf. Hillyer, Edwards, Fuller, Inc. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 742 (E. D. La.
1931). The Board now apparently prefers the value test. Gladstone Corp., 37 B. T. A.
174 (1938) ; Cyrus S. Eaton, 37 B. T. A. 715 (1938) (statement quoted from United Car-
bon case that the clause requires comparison "between the value of the share of each
transferor in the total assets before the exchange and the value of its shares of stock or
interest in the corporation after the exchange"). While the Commissioner acquiesced in
this decision, 1938-2 Cum. BULL. 10, there seems to be no established Bureau practice on
the point. The Regulations take no position. Regulations 103, § 19.112(b) (5)-1, 2.
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"his interest in the property" are deemed to refer to equities, the "prop-
erty" transferred is $16, A's "interest" is 10/16 and B's "interest" 6/16.
As they received stock in the same proportion, the first test is satisfied.
As the stock is worth $1 a share, A has exchanged a $10 asset for $10
of stock and B a $6 equity in an asset for $6 of stock, so that the second
test is also satisfied. If, however, the mortgage were disregarded in
determining the property transferred, A's interest would be 10/20 and
B's interest would be 10/20, but A's stock interest would be 10/16 and
B's 6/16 and neither test would be satisfied. Without discussion of the
point, the Board, in several cases adopted the view that the equities
governed."1 But these decisions were bottomed on the belief that the as-
sumption of a liability was not "other money or property." Having
eliminated that obstacle to the application of Section 112(b) (5), it would
of course have been fruitless to interpret the proviso to raise a barrier
in these cases. It would, however, have been difficult to reach the same
interpretation after the Hendler decision as the Court there regarded
the assumption as cash received by the transferor, in which case the second
set of fractions seem to apply.
As Section 213 had adopted the policy of not making the assumption
of a liability an occasion for recognizing gain, it became necessary to
alter the proviso in Section 112(b) (5). A new sentence was therefore
added to that subsection which provided:
"Where the transferee assumes a liability of a transferor, or where
the property of a transferor is transferred subject to a liability,
then for the purpose only of determining whether the amount of
stock or securities received by each of the transferors is in the
proportion required by this paragraph, the amount of such liability
(if under subsection (k) it is not to be considered as 'other prop-
erty or money') shall be considered as stock or securities received
by such transferor."
In the example above B will be considered as having received $4 worth
of stock in addition to the six shares actually received, so that both
A and B have received in value $10 of stock and in percentage 50 per
cent of the stock. Both the property which B has transferred and B's
interest in the property must now be considered as worth $10, for other-
wise neither the first nor second test will be satisfied and the amendment
81. In Ared Corp., 30 B. T. A. 1080 (1934), where A and B each transferred prop-
erty for stock and the assumption of a liability, the Board, in computing the value uf the
property transferred and the interest of each therein, deducted the amount of the liabili-
ties assumed. See Cyrus S. Eaton, 37 B. T. A. 715 (1938) ; Edwin L. Dana, 36 B. T. A.
231 (1937) ; but cf. Schuh Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933,
(in determining whether assets transferred were substantially all of transferur's assets,
transferee's assumption of liabilities held not to decrease quantity of assets transferred
but merely to lessen amount paid for them); Milton Smith, 34 B. T. A. 702 (1936).
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made to Section 112(b) (5) will be rendered nugatory.8 2 The amendment
thus disregards the equity test as the method of removing the obstacle
of the proviso; the other side of the equation has instead been increased
through hypothetical consideration of the assumption of a liability as
the equivalent of the transferor's receipt of stock or securities in the
amount of the liability. If the assumption is considered as "money" under
the exception provided in subsection 112(k), the hypothetical treatment
as stock or securities for the purpose of Section 112(b) (5) is not oper-
ative, and the assumption is equivalent to the receipt of cash. However,
the same treatment of the property transferred by B and his interest
therein (i.e., $10 in each case) would continue, as Congress must have
intended to treat the case as one in which B had exchanged $10 of prop-
erty owned outright for $6 of stock and $4 of cash.83 Otherwise, if B's
interest were considered as $6, the proviso would be satisfied, as A had
received $10 of stock for $10 of property and B $6 of stock for $6 of
property.
Section 213(e) applies all of the amendments discussed above (Sec-
tion 213 (a)-(d)) to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938.
Subsections 213(f)-(i), however, contain practically identical amend-
ments which reach as far back as 1924, so that the whole problem of
the effect of the assumption of a liability in Section 112(b) (4) and (5)
exchanges has been settled by the adoption of uniform rules for the
entire period.84 By retroactively confirming the prior practice, Congress
has spared taxpayers and the Government the tremendous problems which
upsetting the practice would entail. 5 As the assumption of a liability is
82. Regulations 103, § 19.112(b) (5)-2 so indicate.
83. The amount of "other property or money" received by a transferor, although
taxable under § 112(c) (1), is not deducted from the property transferred in determining
its value for the purpose of the proviso. Diescher v. Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A.
3d, 1940). But see Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B. T. A. 732, 745 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
84. The retroactive counterpart of subsection (k) applies to exchanges occurring in
taxable years ending after Dec. 31, 1923, and beginning before Jan. 1, 1938, and affects
the Revenue Act of 1924 and subsequent Acts through the Revenue Act of 1938. The
retroactive basis and § 112(b) (5) amendments also apply to those Acts. The amended
definition of "reorganization" in § 112(g) extends only to the Revenue Acts of 1934,
1936 and 1938, which were the only prior Acts to contain the "solely" requirement. The
letter designations in § 112(g) (1) are not retroactively altered. As exchanges in a tax-
able year ending in 1924 are governed by both the Revenue Act of 1921 and the Revenue
Act of 1924, these amendments do not disturb this joint effect, but extend only to the
application of the Revenue Act of 1924 to these exchanges.
85. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 20 states:
"The amendments to the Code and the retroactive application of
similar provisions to prior revenue acts taken together establish a
system under which the treatment of recognition of gain and deter-
mination of basis will be under uniform equitable rules for the
periods covered. Since transactions entered into under such acts
were made under the understanding of the law that such assumption
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not to be considered as "other property or money," the Government
may not obtain deficiencies with respect to exchanges in years not closed
by the statute of limitations on which no gain had been reported although
liabilities were assumed. Nor may transferors or transferees obtain
stepped-up bases on the ground that gain should have been recognized
on these prior exchanges."
A difference should be noted between the new subsection 112(k) in
the Code and its counterpart in prior Revenue Acts. As the latter pro-
vision makes no exception for an assumption of a liability involving an
attempt to avoid tax or not having a bona fide business purpose, such
an assumption in an exchange in prior years presumably remains tax-
free. If, on the other hand, gain was recognized by reason of an as-
sumption in a decision of the Board or a court which became final before
September 26, 1939,87 or in a closing agreement, whenever it became
final, determining the tax liability of a taxpayer for the taxable year in
which the exchange occurred, this assumption shall be considered as money
received by the transferor in the amount of the liability considered in
computing the gain. This exception was designed to preserve the effect
in the particular cases of the Hendler decision and other decisions which
of, and taling subject to, liabilities did not give rise to recogniza-
ble gain, it is necessary, in order to prevent hardship on taxpayers
and to prevent tax avoidance, to provide retroactively for the appli-
cation of the rule above provided."
T. D. 4934, § 20A.2, states that the amendments in general confirm the Bureau prac-
tice.
86. The phrase in §§ 113 (a) (6) (7) and (8) "under the law applicable to the year
in which the exchange was made" picks up the amendment made to the prior acts by
§ 213(f), especially in view of § 213 (f) (2). The retroactive amendments were applied
in Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc., 41 B. T. A. No. 80 (1940). In Comm'r v. Corpus Christi
Terminal Co., 110 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) the Board, in a decision prior to the
Revenue Act of 1939 and relying on the Hendler decision, had allowed the transferee's
claim to a stepped-up basis, in regard to a DV ale, on assets acquired in a tax-free ex-
change in 1931 in which the transferee had ;,: sreed liabilities of the transferor. The
circuit court remanded, stating that it was nec(--.try to know if and when the transferee
had discharged the liabilities assumed. The a lliti, Pnal evidence desired, however, seems
irrelevant to the case. Under retroactive § _13(f). the assumption does not result in
recognized gain to the transferor, whether (r not the liabilities were discharged in the
year of assumption or at all, so that a stel;,'cd-up basis could not be claimed on the ground
of recognition of gain to the transferor. Nor could such an increase be warranted because
the transferee had paid the liabilities assumed. See p. 21 supra. While there appears
to be no doubt, either as to statutory con-t:uction or constitutionality, that the retroactive
amendments reach the eaze and requir. a reversal of the Board's decision, the court may
avoid the necessity of passing on the quebtion by following the Bickf ord case if it finds
that the liabilities were not paid in the year of assumption. But payment should not be a
prerequisite to recognition of gain to a transferor under the Hcndlcr doctrine (see p. 29
infra) so that the additional evidence should not be material on this score.
87. That is, the .Icision must have become final before the 90th day after the date
of enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939.
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treated the assumption as "other property or money,"8 8 and to prevent
reduction of either the transferor's or the transferee's basis where it had
been increased by reason of the gain so recognized. If the Bureau has
closed any cases in which an assumption was so treated, and the settle-
ment was not by closing agreement, the taxpayer may sue for a refund
if the period of limitations has not expired, or the lower basis may be
asserted by the Government. But suits of this nature are not to be ex-
pected, as such cases are few in number, if they exist at all. The parties
involved, moreover, may at any time enter into closing agreements rati-
fying their prior action for, unlike the judicial decisions, the closing agree-
ment need not have become final prior to September 26, 1939.89 While
the above exception regarding final court decisions would have frozen
the Hendler case itself, Congress provided in Section 910 of the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939 that the exception should not be
applied to that case and authorized a refund of the tax which Hendler
paid.9" An obscure burial stone in a foreign field thus marks the demise
of the Government's victory in the Hendler case.
FURTHER PROBLEMS RESPECTING SECTION 112(b) (1)
The Bureau practice, supported by Board decisions and general tax-
payer acquiescence, was, as has been pointed out, to recognize gain upon
the assumption of a liability in Section 112(b)(1) exchanges. The
Hendler decision affirmed the general principle which underlay that prac-
tice. Inasmuch as subsection 112(k) added by the 1939 Act and its
retroactive counterpart are restricted to Section 112(b) (4) and (5)
exchanges, Congress must have intended the ratification of the prior
practice in respect to Section 112 (b) (1) exchanges."1 While the phrase
88. E.g., Daily Tel. Co., 34 B. T. A. 101 (1936); Walter F. Haass, 37 B. T. A.
948 (1938).
89. The retroactive § 112(b) (5) contains a proviso similarly preserving a treatment
of the liability different from that effected by lhe amendment, so that the cases mentioned
in note 81 supra are not disturbed.
90. The section states that the provisions of § 213(f) shall apply without regard to
the exception if the taxpayer is a corporation, the determination is by a Board or court
decision, under the law applicable to the taxable year in which the exchange occurred the
transferee's basis is cost to the transferee rather than the transferor's basis, and the trans-
feror has, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, effected a complete liquidation. AP-
parently, the only case that satisfies these requirements is the Hendlcr case itself, so that
this elaborate modification of § 213(f) is no more han an expression of Congress's desire
to relieve Hendler of the tax which he paid.
91. Section 112(b) (2) and (3) exchanges do not 1.4t.,arily involve an assumption
of liabilities, nor is an assumption of liabilities necessa y to their effective operation.
Where §§ 112(b) (3) and (4) overlap so that an exchange is subj,.ct to both sections, an
assumption of liabilities will be tax free. While a parent may assume its subsidiary's lia-
bilities in a liquidation under § 112(b) (6), the problems under consideration do not arise
as gain is not realized upon a liquidation (§ 113(a) (15) makes the subsidiary's basis the
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"other property or money" in Section 112(c) (1) therefore continues
to include the assumption of a liability in a Section 112(b) (1) type
of exchange,92 the precise scope of the coverage remains uncertain.
In recognizing gain because of the assumption of a liability, the Board
looked no further than the fact of assumption to ground a tax for the
year of the exchange, and'did not inquire whether the liability assumed
had actually been paid in the taxable year of the transferor. But in the
Hendler case the Court spoke of "assumption and payment" and said
that the "discharge of liability by the payment of the . . . indebtedness
constituted income." 3 This stress on payment apparently occasioned a
later dictum that "To assume the debts of a company is not to pay
'property or money' to the promisees."'94 This statement implies that
mere assumption without payment would not result in recognized gain
at the time in a Section 112(b) (1) exchange -a view for which there
seems to be little warrant. The question of the proper taxable year rarely
arose in the earlier cases dealing with the assumption of a liability for
income tax. 5 When the question did arise, the courts were not concerned
with the year of payment of the liability but with the year in which the
tax liability assumed became fixed and definite." As the amount of the
liability is known in the exchange cases and as the assumption by the
transferee relieves the transferor of payment of that amount, it seems
immaterial whether the transferee paid that liability, either in accordance
basis of ti - parent without any provision for increase by reason of gain recognized upon
the exchatz'e). The parent's basis Would not be increased on payment of the liabilities.
See p. 21 s, -a.
92. Regulations 103. §§ 19.112(b) (1)-1, 112(c) (1) so provide. The same construc-
tion applies to §§ 112(b) (2) and (3) exchanges.
93. 303 U. S. 564, 566 (1938).
94. Bickdord's, Inc. v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 568, 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
95. In Old Colony Crust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) the corporation in 1916
resolved to pay any in'ome tax thereafter due and payable on its officers' salaries. The tax
paid by the corporati, n was held income to the officer, presumably on a cash basis, for the
year of payment. In United States v. Boston & M. R. R., 279 U. S. 732 (1932) the les-
sor's 1917 tax, presumably on the accrual basis, paid by the lessee in 1918 was income to
the lessor for 1917. In neither case was the question of the proper year raised.
96. Appeal of Providence & W. R. R., 5 B. T. A. 1186 (1927) (as lessor's tax
for 1920 did not accrue until 1921, when it became due and payable, lessee's payment of the
tax in 1921 held in ome to the lessor for 1921, not 1920) ; accord, Appeal of Norwich &
NV. R. R., 2 B. T. A. 215 (1925), aff'd sub non. United States v. Norwich & IV. R. R.,
16 F. (2d) 944 (1) Mass. 1926); Belt Ry. of Chicago, 9 B. T. A. 304 (1927), aff'd on
other issues, 36 F (2d) 541 (App. D. C. 1929). cert. denied, 281 U. S. 742 (1930). Con-
tra: Comm'r v. Terre Haute Elec. Co., 67 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) (lessee's
payment of tax held income for year in which tax was due) ; Acme Coal Co. v. United
States, 44 F. (2d) 95 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (vendee's payment of tax on vendor's profit on sale held
income to vendor for year of sale as part of sale profit) ; C. B. Shaffer, 29 B. T. A. 1315
(1934) (payment treated as income for year tax was payable, as vendor's liability was un-
certain and speculative until then) ; accord, E. A. Hughes, 32 B. T. A. 1248 (1935).
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with the terms of the liability or otherwise, in the year of the exchange
or any subsequent year. 7 If the assumption were not to result in recog-
nized gain to the transferor until payment by the transferee, the Govern-
ment would lose many taxes through its inability to make a careful check
upon all cases. 8
While there seems to be no magic attached to the fact of payment, that
event does finally measure the value of the transferee's promise to pay
the liability and answers the question that is begged by the previous use
of the words "relieves the transferee of payment." Can we say that the
transferee's mere assumption of a $1,000 liability payable two years
afterward is worth $1,000 to the transferor, or must we inquire further
into the transferee's financial status and the value of his promise? If
it appears very unlikely that the transferee will actually pay, shall we
assign some rough value, or even no value, to the promise, and wait until
actual payment before we collect the full tax? The prior practice and
the Board cases found no difficulty with this point. The assumption of
liability was regarded as falling not within the term "property" in the
phrase "other property or money," but within the term "money." 00 Val-
uation difficulties were thus avoided and the assumption considered as
money in the amount of the liability.
The Revenue Act of 1939 confirms this practice for, wherever per-
tinent, the assumption is expressly treated as money in the amount of
97. But cf. James M. Butler, 19 B. T. A. 718 (1930) where the lessee's assumption
of the lessor's mortgage was held not to result iii income to the lessor in the year of
assumption, but only as lessee made payments; lessor was still liable on mortgage and
his liability reduced only as lessee made payments on mortgage principal.
98. Regulations 103, § 19.113(a) (6)-2 indicate that gain is to be recognized whether
or not there is payment by the transferee.
The contention that the mere assumption of the liability constitutes the receipt of
"money," and that it is not necessary to postpone recognition of gain until the liability is
paid, is an assertion that the Hendler case does not rest upon the doctrine of "constructive
receipt." Observe that in the Hendler case the Court relied on Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716 (1929), which is a "constructive receipt" case also involving the
discharge of the assumed debt. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 40 B. T. A, No. 170
(1939) in which A's debt of $500,000 to B had been assumed and discharged by C for
$484,687.50 after C's acquisition of A's assets. Although the Commissioner asserted that
the $484,687.50 was part of the consideration, the Board stated "It may be that the correct
amount would have been $500,000, since that is the measure of the benefit to Melrose (A)
accruing from the discharge of the obligation. Since, however, respondent has elected to
proceed upon a theory involving a small deficiency, we find it unnecessary to decide the
point. At least to the extent of the figures stated, Melrose received a taxable considera-
tion." Compare also Federal St. & P. V. Ry. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 3d,
1936).
99. In Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 376, 381 (1936) the Board said "We are not
unmindful of the fact that the assumption of a mortgage is not money in a true legal sense.
It is, however, part of the consideration received; it is the equivalent of money, and . ..
must be treated as money for the purposes of this case."
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the liability.' This position, as stated above, accords with the normal
case and permits simple adjustment in the few instances where the trans-
feree does not make full payment. Where the property is merely trans-
ferred subject to a liability, without any assumption by the transferee,
the extent to which the transferor is relieved of payment depends largely
on the relation of the property's value to the liability. However, as the
property is generally sufficient to cover the debt, the same treatment has
been applied and gain has been recognized to the amount of the liability.10'
If the transferor is himself not personally liable, as where he has taken
the property subject to the liability, his gain may not seem so clear when
the transferee takes subject to the liability. But if A acquires for $60
property worth $100 but subject to a $40 liability, his cost, and hence
the basis of the property in his hands, is $100 - just as it would be if
he had assumed the liability -as it is expected that he will pay the
liability so as to keep the property. By means of this credit in advance
for the expected payment, it is possible to keep the basis for depreciation
linked to the property's value. When A in turn transfers the property
subject to the liability, the amount of the liability must therefore be
regarded as gain to him.0 2 The Revenue Act of 1939 does not dis-
tinguish between the assumption of a liability and the acquisition of
property subject to a liability, and no distinction should be made in a
Section 112(b)(1) type of exchange.
10 3
It is a frequent occurrence in Section 112(b) (1) exchanges for both
properties involved to be encumbered by mortgages, so that the exchange
100. Under the prior law, if the assumption were treated as "property" and valued at
less than the liability's face amount, a lesser amount of gain would be recognized at the time
of the exchange. The assumption as "property" would receive such value as its basis under
§ 113(a) (6). As the amount of gain by which the old basis must be increased and the
amount by which it must be decreased (the portion allocated to the assumption) are thus
equally lower, the tax-free property would have the same basis as if gain were recognized
to the amount of the liability. If all went well, therefore, no gain would permanently
escape tax. Under the Revenue Act of 1939 amendment to § 113(a) (6), however, the
assumption must be treated as "money" to the amount of the liability and the old basis
reduced by such amount. Unless the assumption also is treated as "money" for the pur-
pose of recognition of gain, the basis of the tax-free property will be too low, for the in-
crease in the old basis would be less than the amount by which it had been so reduced.
Proper coordination between the recognition of gain provisions and the basis provisions,
as amended, therefore also requires the assumption to be treated as "money" to the amount
of the liability for the purpose of recognition of gain. Of course, although the assumption
is treated as "money" for the recognition of gain, it is not twice deducted from the basis,
once as "money" under the old wording and again as "money" under the amendment.
101. Estate of Theodore Ebert, Jr., 37 B. T. A. 186 (1938).
102. Where the transferor himself placed the obligation upon the property after its
acquisition and received the money, the basis is unaffected; unless the transferee's assump-
tion of this obligation is considered income, the transferor will have received money on
which he will have paid no tax.
103. Regulations 103, § 19.113(a) (6)-2, follow this approach and treat the liability as
money whether it is assumed or only taken subject to.
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is made subject to the respective mortgages, or each party assumes the
other's mortgage. Suppose that A has property with a $20,000 basis,
worth $45,000, and subject to a $15,000 mortgage. He exchanges his
property for property of B, worth $30,000 but subject to a $10,000 mort-
gage, and $10,000 cash. Each assumes the mortgage on the property
he receives. The Bureau has ruled that the amount of "money" which
A receives by reason of B's assumption of the mortgage is measured
by the "net reduction" in his indebtedness - here, $15,000 minus $10,000,
or $5,000.1o4 A, under this ruling, has a realized gain of $30,000 plus
$10,000 cash plus $5,000 in net reduction of indebtedness, or $45,000,
less the $20,000 basis, or $25,000. This gain is recognized to the extent
of the "other property or money"- $10,000 plus $5,000, or $15,000.
A's basis for the new property is his old basis, $20,000, decreased by
the money received, $15,000, increased in the amount of gain recognized,
likewise $15,000, or $20,000. The computations would presumably be
made on the same principle if there were a net increase in indebtedness.'
00
The same rule seems to apply if C exchanges property worth $30,000
for property of D worth $25,000 but subject to a $4,000 mortgage
which C assumes, and $9,000 cash, so that the gain which C realizes is
recognized only to the extent of $5,000 and not the full $9,000 in cash.
The Board has followed this ruling in its computations, although the
point has not been specifically discussed and apparently has not been
considered.' The Revenue Act of 1939, however, may raise some doubts
as to the ruling's validity. The treatment which it accords to the as-
sumption of a liability departs from the concept of the transfer of an
equity by the transferor, and treats the assumption in theory as valuable
consideration, in the nature of cash, received by the transferor, although
the assumption, for policy reasons, does not result in the recognition of
gain. More specifically, the basis provision, Section 113(g) (6), states
that the assumption shall be considered as money received by the trans-
feror in the amount of the liability."' This approach arguably would
fix the "money" received by A in the above example at $20,000 - the
$10,000 cash plus the assumption by B of a $10,000 liability of A. The
realized gain would remain the same, $25,000, though computed differ-
ently - $30,000 plus $10,000 less $20,000 (the basis of the old prop-
erty) plus $5,000 (the additional cost to A by reason of his assumption
104. G. C. M. 2641. VI-2 Cumi. BULL. 16 (1927).
105. Thus, as B had a net increase in indebtedness, no gain would be recognized to him
even if his property were worth $40,000 so that no actual cash would have had to pass.
106. Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 376 (1936); Estate of Theodore Ebert, Jr., 37
B. T. A. 186 (1938). The point was immaterial in both cases as the net decrease in in-
debtedness was more than the profit on the transaction.
107. Although new subsection (k) does not extend to a § 112(b) (1) type of exchange,
the amendment to § 113 (a) (6) applies to such an exchange as well as to those affected by
subsection (). Regulations 103, § 19.113(a) (6)-2.
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of B's mortgage) -but it would be recognized to the extent of $20,000.
The basis of the new property would be higher - $20,000 (the basis of
the old property) plus $5,000 (the basis of A's assumption of liability) 10
less $20,000 of "money" plus $20,000 gain recognized, or $25,000. This
approach may be answered by the argument that if the assumptions are
to be treated as "money," it is only sensible to offset them against each
other to find the net amount of "money" that is received -the way the
parties themselves would treat the situation if, by chance, cash were
actually to pass.
The "net reduction in indebtedness" approach results in a smaller tax
at the time of the exchange and a lower basis for the property received,
so that if all goes well the Government will later obtain a tax on the
remainder of the gain. The other view yields a greater tax at the time
of the exchange and consequently a higher basis.1"' Perhaps the decision
between the two will turn on the treatment given to Section 112(b) (1)
exchanges. It is somewhat significant, and also somewhat puzzling, that,
in the Revenue Act of 1939, Congress treated these exchanges differently
from corporate reorganizations and Section 112(b) (5) transfers. Some
may believe that there is little warrant for the difference; if the policy
underlying Section 112(b) (1) is sound, there is just as much reason
to fulfill that policy by postponing the tax in the case of an assumption
of a liability as there is in the reorganization cases. As most corpora-
tions have liabilities which must be assumed on reorganization, most
property is similarly encumbered with mortgages which, under current
conditions, must be assumed upon an exchange. The reason for the
diversity of treatment may perhaps be that through long experience tax-
payers have been habituated to considering the assumption of a liability
as "money" on a Section 112(b) (1) exchange but not on a Section
112(b) (4) or (5) transfer, so that the Hendler decision came as no
shock to the real estate profession. Congress was certainly not urged to
alter the Section 112(b) (1) rule; the demand concerned only reorgan-
izations. The reason may lie in the added complexity which a minus basis
causes in Section 112(b) (1) cases- as the transferee does not take a
substituted basis, so that the gain cannot be taxed through him at a later
108. If a taxpayer exchanges property and $10,000 cash for like property of another
taxpayer, § 112(b) (1) still applies, as the word "solely" refers to what is received and not
to what is given. W. H. Hartman Co., 20 B. T. A. 302 (1930); George r. Hamilton, 30
B. T. A. 160 (1934). For the purpose of § 113(a) (6), the "property exchanged" is both
the property and the cash; the amount of the cash hence must be added to the property's
basis. As the assumption of a liability is considered equivalent to the exchange of money,
the amount of the assumption must therefore be added to the basis of tie property, as indi-
cated in the text.
109. Whichever approach is adopted for the purposes of recognition of gain under
§ 112(c) (1), the same approach must be used in determining the basis under § 113(a) (6).
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date, the transferor, if his basis is to be brought to zero, must be taxed
at the time of the exchange on the difference between the minus figure
and zero if that portion of the gain is to be taxed at all. But this problem
could be solved without too much difficulty.110 In any event, Congress
chose not to extend relief to Section 112(b) (1), so that problems con-
cerning the assumption of a liability on exchanges under that section still
remain unsettled.
110. If new subsection (k) were extended to § 112(b) (1), it would not be necessary to
choose between the two approaches discussed in the text.
